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Résumé / Abstract
Nous examinons le problème des relations verticales. Quand un
fournisseur discrimine, est-ce qu'il impose aux firmes à coût marginal plus bas un
prix de l'input plus haut que celui qu'il impose aux firmes à coût marginal plus
haut? Nous montrons que cela dépend de la capacité des firmes aval à
partiellement produire l'input. Nous fournissons aussi une formule de charge
d'accès dans le cas où les firmes aval sont des compétiteurs à la Cournot non
identiques. Finalement, nous développons un modèle de discrimination par la
qualité d'un input, et nous montrons que la firme amont peut trouver profitable de
traiter différemment des firmes identiques.
This paper explores several aspects of the vertical relationship between an
upstream firm and a number of downstream firms that are Cournot rivals relying
on the inputs provided by the upstream firm. We address the following questions:
(i) if the upstream firm can charge different prices to different downstream firms,
will it charge higher prices to more efficient firms? (ii) if the upstream firm can
provide different levels of quality of access to several ex ante identical
downstream firms, will it provide a uniform quality of access? The answer to (i)
depends on whether downstream firms can self-supply. As for (ii), we show that
equals may be treated unequally.
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1 Introduction
The vertical relationship between an \upstream" monopolist and a set of
\downstream" rms that rely on the upstream monopolist for a vital in-
termediate input has received a great deal of attention in the literarure on
industrial organization and regulation. The terms \upstream" and \down-
stream" should not be taken literally, as the following examples illustrate. In
the petroleum industry, the upstream rm is the supplier of crude oil, and
the downstream rms are oil reneries. However, in telecommunications, the
downstream rms serve the market for long distance calls, while the upstream
rm is the owner of the local network, without which the long-distance tele-
phone companies cannot sell their products to the consumers. In the market
for electricity, it is often the case that electricity transmission and distribu-
tion is controlled by one rm, but electricity generation is not. Downstream
rms generate electricity and sell it to consumers, using an essential input
which is the transmission network provided by the owner of the network,
considered as an \upstream" rm. In some situations, an upstream rm can
also be integrated with a downstream rm (e.g., the case of the owner of a
local telephone network who also provides long distance services, in direct
competition with several other \downstream" long-distance service rms).
Some of the major questions concerning the \upstream-downstream" re-
lationship are: (i) does the upstream monopolist have an incentive to practice
input price discrimination when downstream rms are not identical? (ii) does
input price discrimination favour less ecient rms? (iii) how do the answers
to the above questions change if (a) the downstream rms can also produce,
perhaps at higher costs, the input themselves, or (b) the upstream rm is
integrated with a downstream rm to supply the nal good to consumers, in
direct competition with other downstream rms? (iv) if the upstream rm
can provide input at dierent quality levels to dierent downstream rms,
will it give equal treatment to ex ante identical downstream rms? (v) in the
case of input quality discrimination, if an upstream rm is integrated with
a downstream rm, does the integrated rm have an incentive to reduce the
quality of access to its rival downstream rms?
Partial answers to some of the above questions have been provided by
DeGraba (1990) and Katz (1987). Assuming that downstream rms cannot
produce the input, DeGraba shows
1
that, under linear demand, \when the
1
DeGraba pointed out (p.1248) that this result was presented in Katz (1987) for
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supplier is allowed to price-discriminate, he charges the rms with lower
marginal cost a higher price than he charges the rm with the higher marginal
cost"(p.1248). This theoretical result is called \discount reversal" because
it predicts the exact opposite of the \quantity discount" phenomenon, i.e.,
the empirical observation that larger buyers tend to be charged less per unit
than smaller ones. DeGraba explains that \the apparent contradiction stems
from the fact that quantity discounts are used as a self-selection mechanism
when the seller does not know the demand curves of the buyers"(p.1248).
In DeGraba's model, because of the assumption of perfect information, such
quantity discounts do not arise. DeGraba's explanation seems to suggest
that under perfect information, one would not observe quantity discount.
However, Katz (1987) has shown that quantity discounts may arise even
under perfect information, if the input supplied by the upstream rm can
also be produced by the downstream rms, under a special form of increas-
ing returns: constant marginal cost, and declining average cost, owing to a
strictly positive xed cost in the production of the intermediate input. Thus,
according to Katz, a monopolist that sells an input would oer to a large
buyer, such as a chain store, a better deal than the ones the monopolist
oers to local stores, because the chain store can make the credible threat
of producing the input itself as it has the potential advantage of economies
of scale. Katz's model seems to suggest that increasing return is a crucial
factor for quantity discount under perfect information.
In addition to the above \positive" issues, the \normative" issues of reg-
ulation have received a great deal of attention in the industrial organization
literature. If there exists a regulator that seeks to maximize social welfare,
what are the appropriate regulations on input prices (or access prices) and
input quality? Recent works by Vickers (1995), Armstrong, Doyles, and
Vickers (or ADV, 1996), Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1996a, 1996b) have shed
much light on these topics. Vickers (1995) considers the case where the
downstream rms are symmetric Cournot rivals under free entry (implying
zero prots), while ADV (1996) considers a downstream competitive fringe,
that takes as given the price announced by a dominant integrated rm. ADV
provides an ECPR (ecient component pricing rule) formula that relates the
input price (or access price) to the direct cost and to the opportunity cost of
providing access.
Cournot players. DeGraba's main interest is in how price discrimination aects down-
stream producers' long-run choice of technology.
2
Among the issues that we take up in our paper is the discount reversal
result. We begin by showing that if downstream rms cannot self-supply
the input, then discount reversal occurs even when the demand curve is
not linear and marginal cost is not constant. Next, we consider the case
where downstream rms can self-supply, and show that quantity discount
can occur even under decreasing returns, in contrast to Katz's assumption
of increasing returns.We also derive an access pricing formula for the case in
which downstream rms are asymmetric Cournot rivals. Since we postulate
that the objective is to maximize the prot of the upstream rm (or, in
some cases, the vertically integrated rm) rather than to maximize social
welfare, our access pricing formula is not directly comparable to those of
ADV. However, broadly speaking, there is certain similarity in interpretation.
Another important issue that we address in this paper is input quality
discrimination. As pointed out by Vickers (1995, p.14), input price is only
one of several possible ways that an integrated rm could use to restrict
access. Another dimension of restriction is the quality of access. Quality
discrimination gives an integrated rm an alternative way of raising rivals'
costs. A possible example is the interconnection of telecommunication net-
works. According to Vickers, \though the pricing terms on which British
Telecom was to give access to its rival Mercury were set in 1985, there has
been continuing dispute about the quality of that access in terms of delay, the
quality of the lines of exchanges, etc., and the impact on Mercury's compet-
itive position."(p. 14). Our paper complements Vickers' informal discussion
on quality discrimination by providing a formal analysis of a model of in-
put quality discrimination, where an integrated rm can provide access at
dierent quality levels to several downstream rivals. We show that it can
be optimal for the integrated rm to treat ex-ante identical rivals in non-
identical ways. Our result, the optimality of the rule \unequal treatment of
equals", indicates that models in which identical rms are assumed to be
treated equally, can be misleading
2
.
2 The Basic Model
In this section we consider the simplest case of vertical relationship: it is
assumed that the downstream rms have no alternative sources of supply of
2
For another instance of \unequal treatment of equals", see Long and Soubeyran
(1997b).
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the vital input, and the upstream rm does not participate in the nal good
market. Our model is similar to that of DeGraba (1990), but we replace his
assumption of linear nal demand by non-linear nal demand, and we assume
convex downstream cost instead of constant marginal costs. Furthermore,
while DeGraba assumes that, in relation to input prices, downstream rms
dier from each other in an additive way (i.e., rm i's per-unit cost of output
is t
i
+ c
i
, where t
i
is the input price for rm i determined by the upstream
monopolist, and c
i
is an additional marginal cost of production which vary
across rms), we assume that, in relation to input costs, downstream rms
dier from each other in a multiplicative way (i.e., rm i's per-unit cost of
output is t
i
D
i
(q
i
)=q
i
, where D
i
(q
i
) is the input level necessary to produce
output q
i
:) We will show that \discount reversal" (i.e., the upstream rm
charges a lower price to smaller downstream rms) occurs in this model, as
it does in DeGraba's model.
3
There are n downstream Cournot oligopolists producing a homogenous
good, using an intermediate input produced by an upstream monopolist.
The set of downstream rms is N = f1; 2; :::; ng. Let q
i
denote the output of
(downstream) rm i, and let Q =
P
i2N
q
i
. In order to produce the quantity
q
i
, the downstream rm i needs to use z
i
units of the intermediate input:
z
i
= D
i
(q
i
), where D
i
(0) = 0, D
0
i
> 0 and D
00
i
 0. We refer to D
i
(:) as
the downstream input-requirement function of rm i.The upstream supplier,
denoted by S, charges rm i the input price t
i
(per unit) and possibly a
xed fee T
i
. Firm i also incurs a xed cost F
i
 0 (exogenously given.) Let
y
i
be the amount of input that downstream rm i buys from rm S. In
this section, since we assume that the downstream rms have no alternative
sources of input supply, we have y
i
= z
i
:
We consider a two-stage game. In the rst stage, the supplier S chooses
rm-specic input prices (t
1
; :::; t
n
) or rm-specic two-part taris (t
i
; T
i
),
i = 1; :::; n. In the second stage, the downstream rms choose their outputs,
and achieve a Cournot equilibrium.
The inverse demand function for the nal good is P = P (Q) with P
0
(Q) <
0: In addition, it is assumed that
QP
00
(Q)=[ P
0
(Q)] < n+ 1 (1)
3
For the case of constant marginal costs and non-linear demand, see Long and
Soubeyran (1997b), where the discount reversal is explained in terms of the \concentration
motive theorem."
4
i.e., the demand curve is not too convex
4
. Given t
1
; :::t
n
, we have, at a
Cournot equilibrium where all rms produce, the conditions
P
0
(
^
Q)q^
i
+ P (
^
Q) = t
i
D
0
i
(q^
i
); i 2 N (2)
where the hat denotes the Cournot equilibrium outputs. It is convenient to
dene the equilibrium marginal cost of rm i as

i
 t
i
D
0
i
(q^
i
) (3)
Then (2) becomes
q^
i
=
P (
^
Q)  
i
[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
(4)
Firm i's prot function is:

i
= P (Q)q
i
  t
i
D
i
(q
i
)  T
i
  F
i
Using (2) to substitute for t
i
,we can write the equilibrium prot of rm i as
^
i
= P (
^
Q)q^
i
 
"
P
0
(
^
Q)q^
i
+ P (
^
Q)
D
0
i
(q^
i
)
#
D
i
(q^
i
)  T
i
  F
i
or, more compactly,
^
i
=

1 
1
^
i

P (
^
Q)q^
i
+
1
^
i
[ P
0
(
^
Q)]q^
2
i
  T
i
  F
i
(5)
where ^
i
is the elasticity of the downstream input-requirement function of
rm i, evaluated at the Cournot equilibrium:
^
i

q^
i
D
0
i
(q^
i
)
D
i
(q^
i
)
The prot function of the upstream rm is

S
=
X
i2N
t
i
y
i
  C(y) + T
4
For a complete set of assumptions that guarantees existence and uniqueness of a
Cournot equilibrium, see Gaudet and Salant (1991). We adopt those assumptions for our
model.
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where y =
P
i2N
y
i
and C(y) is the upstream rm's cost of producing y, and
where T =
P
n
i=1
T
i
:Given t
1
; :::t
n
, the supplier's prot at the corresponding
(downstream) Cournot equilibrium is
^

S
=
X
i2N
"
P
0
(
^
Q)q^
i
+ P (
^
Q)
D
0
i
(q^
i
)
#
D
i
(q^
i
)  C
"
X
i2N
D
i
(q^
i
)
#
+ T
Equivalently,
^

S
=
X
i2N
1
^
i
h
P
0
(
^
Q)q^
2
i
+ P (
^
Q)q^
i
i
  C
"
X
i2N
D
i
(q^
i
)
#
+ T (6)
In the rst stage, the supplier, S, chooses the t
i
's (and possibly the xed
charges T
i
's) to maximize its prot. From (3) and (4), it is clear that the
choice of the t
i
's is equivalent to the manipulation of the marginal costs 
i
's of
the downstream rms, which in turn is equivalent to choosing the equilibrium
outputs q^
i
's. Of course the participation constraints ^
i
 0 must be satised.
In what follows, we focus on the benchmark case where S cannot use
two-part taris nor other forms of non-linear pricing. Thus the T
i
's are
constrained to be zero. We further simplify the problem by assuming that
the upstream cost is linear
C(y) = cy; c > 0
and that the downtream rms' input requirement functions are convex and
exhibit constant elasticity:
D
i
(q
i
) =
d
i
q

i

;   1; d
i
> 0:
Then rm S's prot in the (downstream) Cournot equilibrium becomes
^

S
=
1

P (
^
Q)
^
Q 
1

[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
^
Q
2
^
H  
c

X
i2N
d
i
q^

i
(7)
where
^
H is the Herndahl index of concentration of the downstream industry:
^
H =
X
i2N
h
q^
i
=
^
Q
i
2
6
As will be seen below, the discriminatory price structure chosen by S depends
on the Herndahl index of concentration and on the elasticity of the slope of
the demand curve.
We now solve rm S's optimization problem. It is convenient to proceed
in two steps. In the rst step, we temporarily xed the industry output
^
Q,
and seek to characterize the monopolist's choice of the q^
i
's, conditional on
P
n
i=1
q^
i
=
^
Q (given). In the second step, we determine
^
Q.
The rst step:
We re-write
^

S
as
^

S
=
1

"
P (
^
Q)
^
Q 
n
X
i=1
f
i
(q^
i
;
^
Q)
#
(8)
where
f
i
(q^
i
;
^
Q)  [ P
0
(
^
Q)]q^
2
i
+ cd
i
q^

i
For a given
^
Q, choose the Cournot equilibrium outputs, the q^
i
's, to maximize
(8) subject to
P
n
i=1
q^
i
=
^
Q and the non-negativity of q^
i
and ^
i
. (We will focus
on the case where the solution is an interior solution, i.e., q^
i
> 0 and ^
i
> 0).
The Lagrangian is
L =
1

"
fP (
^
Q)  g
^
Q+
n
X
i=1
fq^
i
  f
i
(q^
i
;
^
Q)g
#
and is strictly concave in the q^
i
for a given
^
Q. Then, at an interior solution,
 
@f
i
(q^
i
;
^
Q)
@q^
i
= 0; i 2 N (9)
Equation (9) implies
+ 2P
0
(
^
Q)q^

i
= d
i
c (q^

i
)
 1
> 0; i 2 N
It follows from this equation that q^

i
> q^

j
if and only if d
i
< d
j
: Thus we
have established the following result:
Proposition 2.1: The monopolist will adopt an input pricing scheme
that ensures that low-cost rms (i.e., those with low d
i
) produce more than
high cost rms. Furthermore, marginal production costs, d
i
 (q^

i
)
 1
are not
equalized across rms.
7
The results that marginal production costs are not equalized across rms
is due to the fact that the monopolist is constrained to use linear pricing for
each downstream rm, leaving them with positive prots.
5
Equation (9) can be inverted
6
to give
q^

i
= 
i
(;
^
Q) (10)
and the optimal value of , denoted by 

(
^
Q), can thus be obtained from the
condition
X
i2N
q^

i
=
X
i2N

i
(;
^
Q) =
^
Q (11)
(See the Appendix for two examples that illustrate this procedure). The
optimal rm-specic input prices are
t

i
=
P
0
(
^
Q)q^

i
+ P (
^
Q)
d
i
(q^

i
)
 1
(12)
which, together with (9), yields the formula for rm S's mark-up
t

i
  c =
(   2)P
0
(
^
Q)q^

i
+ (P (
^
Q)  )
d
i
(q^

i
)
 1
(13)
The right-hand side of (13) is increasing in q^

i
for  in the interval [1,2], and
decreasing in d
i
.This fact, together with Proposition 2.1 (which says that q^

i
is decreasing in d
i
) yields the following result:
Proposition 2.2: For  in the interval [1,2], the monopolist will practice
\discount reversal", i.e., rms that are more ecient (those with a smaller
d
i
) must pay a higher price per unit of input supplied by the monopolist.
Another sucient condition for \discount reversal" is 2P (
^
Q) 

(
^
Q) > 0
(given that   1). To see this, re-write (12) as
t

i
=
fP
0
(
^
Q)q^

i
+ P (
^
Q)g
2P
0
(
^
Q)q^

i
+ 

(
^
Q)
5
It is easy to verify that if the monopolist could use two-part pricing then T
i
would be
set so that ^
i
= 0, in which case downtream marginal costs would be equalized.
6
Because @q^
i
=@ > 0.
8
It follows from this equation that, for given
^
Q, t

i
is increasing in q^

i
if 2P (
^
Q) 


(
^
Q) > 0:
Proposition 2.3: For   1 , the monopolist will practice \discount
reversal" if 2P (
^
Q)  

(
^
Q) > 0.
Remark: Proposition 2.3 requires the knowledge of 

(
^
Q). The exam-
ples in the Appendix show how 

(
^
Q) can be computed. Alternatively, as
Proposition 2.4 below indicates, we can nd sucient conditions for 2P (
^
Q) 


(
^
Q) > 0 in terms of the curvature of the demand curve and the index of
concentration of the downstream industry.
It remains to determine the monopolist's optimal
^
Q: This is done in the
second step below.
The second step:
We now try to express the monopolist's prot as a function of
^
Q, hav-
ing known how, for a given
^
Q, the q^

i
(and hence t

i
) are optimally chosen.
Following the duality approach used in Rockafellar (1970, Chapter 12), we
dene the \conjugate function" f

of the original function f
i
(q^
i
;
^
Q) as follows:
f

i
(;
^
Q) = sup
q^
i
h
q^
i
  f
i
(q^
i
;
^
Q)
i
; q^
i
 0;
where
^
Q is given. Then, the prot function of the monopolist, given the
maximization performed in Step 1 above, is


S
(
^
Q) = L

(
^
Q) =
1

"
(P (
^
Q)  

(
^
Q))
^
Q+
X
i2N
f

i
(

(
^
Q);
^
Q)
#
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal
^
Q must satisfy the rst order
condition:

d

S
(
^
Q)
d
^
Q
= (P
0
(
^
Q)  

0
(
^
Q))
^
Q+ (P (
^
Q)  

(
^
Q))
+
X
i2N
@f

i
@
d

d
^
Q
+
X
i2N
@f

i
@
^
Q
= 0 (14)
Using the envelope theorem, we have @f

i
=@ = q^

i
, and (14) becomes

d

S
(
^
Q)
d
^
Q
= P (
^
Q)  

(
^
Q) + P
0
(
^
Q)
^
Q [1 + EH] = 0 (15)
9
where H is the Herndahl index of concentration (1  H  (1=n)
2
) dened
as
H =
X
i2N
q^

i
^
Q
2
2
and E is the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve at
^
Q : E =
P
00
(
^
Q)
^
Q=[ P
0
(
^
Q)]:
Remark: By denition, the Herndahl index of concentration is at its
maximum value (H = 1) if the industry output, Q, is produced by one rm,
and H is at its minimum (H = 1=n
2
) if all the n rms have identical market
shares.
If 

S
(
^
Q) is strictly concave
7
in
^
Q and the maximum is an interior one,
then equation (15) uniquely determines the optimal
^
Q

. At that optimum
point,
2P (
^
Q

)  

(
^
Q

) = P (
^
Q

)  P
0
(
^
Q

)
^
Q

[1 + E

H

] (16)
The right-hand side of this equation is positive if E

 0 (this inequality
holds if the demand curve is linear or convex), or if E

< 0 but E

H

  1.
Using this result and Proposition 2.3, we obtain:
Proposition 2.4: For \discount reversal" to occur, it is sucient that
the demand curve is linear or convex (implying E

 0), or that it is not too
concave, i.e., E

H

  1:
The optimal input price that the monopolist charges rm i is obtained
from (12), (9), and (16):
t

i
=
c [P
0
(
^
Q

)q^

i
+ P (
^
Q

)]
2P
0
(
^
Q

)q^

i
+ P (
^
Q

) + P
0
(
^
Q

)
^
Q

[1 + E

H

]
where the denominator is positive because it must be the same as the de-
nominator of the right-hand side of (12), the left-hand side being t

i
in both
equations. This input price is dependent on the concentration index of the
downstream industry, and on the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve.
3 Extension: Self-supply by Downstream Firms
In the preceding section, the downstream rms must rely entirely on the
upstream monopolist for their input. We now relax that assumption and
7
A set of sucient conditions for this to hold is  = 1 and P (Q) is linear.
10
consider the case where they can produce the input themselves. We wish
to nd out whether the dominant upstream rm still nd it protable to
practice \discount reversal".
We continue to assume that, in order to produce q
i
units of the nal
good, the downstream rm i needs D
i
(q
i
) units of the intermediate input. It
can satisfy this need by purchasing y
i
units of the intermediate input from
the upstream rm S, and producing x
i
units of the intermediate input itself,
such that y
i
+ x
i
= D
i
(q
i
). Let t
i
be the rm-specic price charged by the
upstream rm S. Let U
i
(x
i
) be the cost to rm i of producing x
i
. We assume
that U
i
(x
i
) is strictly convex, with U
i
(0) = 0, U
0
i
(0) = 0 and U
0
i
(1) =1.The
prot function of rm i is

i
= Pq
i
  t
i
[D
i
(q
i
)  x
i
]  U
i
(x
i
)  F
i
  T
i
where T
i
is the xed fee imposed by the dominant upstream rm S if y
i
> 0.
It is important to note that since the downstream rm can produce the
intermediate input with the cost U
i
(x
i
) as specied above, the upstream rm
can never charge a fee that would reduce rm i's prot to zero.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the rst stage, the upstream
rm S sets discriminatory input prices t
i
, i = 1; :::; n, or two-part taris
(t
i
; T
i
). In the second stage, the downstream rms simultaneously and non-
cooperatively choose their output levels q
i
. In the third stage, each down-
stream rm i makes its procurement decision: how much of the required
input D
i
(q
i
) is to be purchased from the upstream rm S, and how much is
to be self-supplied.
As usual, the game is solved backwards. We consider rst the choice
made in the third stage. For given t
i
, T
i
and q
i
, the rm i minimizes the cost
of producing q
i
. Let
C
i
(t
i
; q
i
) = min
x
i
fF
i
+ T
i
+ t
i
[D
i
(q
i
)  x
i
] + U
i
(x
i
)g (17)
subject to D
i
(q
i
)  x
i
 0. In what follows, we will restrict attention to the
case where q
i
is suciently large, and the cost U
i
(x
i
) is suciently convex so
that the constraint D
i
(q
i
)  x
i
is not binding. This means that we focus on
equilibria where self-supply is only partial. Then problem (17) is equivalent
to that of nding:
V

i
(t
i
)  max
x
i
ft
i
x
i
  U
i
(x
i
)g
11
subject to x
i
 0. This problem yields x
i
= x
i
(t
i
), with
x
0
i
(t
i
) =
1
U
00
i
(x
i
)
> 0 (18)
We can therefore express the cost function C
i
(t
i
; q
i
) as
C
i
(t
i
; q
i
) = F
i
+ T
i
+ t
i
D
i
(q
i
)  V

i
(t
i
)
We now turn to the second stage, when the rms choose their q
i
, taking
the t
i
as given.. The necessary conditions for a Cournot equilibrium in this
stage are the same as in the preceding section. Firm i's equilibrium prot is
^
i
=

1 
1
^
i

P (
^
Q)q^
i
+
1
^
i
[ P
0
(
^
Q)]q^
2
i
  T
i
  F
i
+ V

i
(t
i
)
and the prot of the upstream monopolist is

S
=
X
i2N
t
i
[D
i
(q^
i
)  x
i
(t
i
)]  C
S
"
X
i2N
fD
i
(q^
i
)  x
i
(t
i
)g
#
+
X
i2N
T
i
where T
i
= 0 if two-part tari is not allowed.(Note that since rm i can make
a positive prot without buying input from S; in the case where two-part
taris are allowed, rm S cannot impose a value of T
i
that would eliminate
rm i 's prot.)
Consider the special case where the downstream cost functions D
i
(q
i
) are
linear: D
i
(q
i
) = d
i
q
i
. Then the Cournot equilibrium output q
i
satises
q^
i
=
P (
^
Q)  
i
[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
= q^
i
(
^
Q; 
i
) (19)
where by denition 
i
is rm i's marginal cost: 
i
= d
i
t
i
. Note that
@q^
i
(
^
Q; 
i
)
@
i
=
1
[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
< 0 (20)
Let 
N
= (1=n)
P
i2N

i
. Summing (19) over all rms gives
^
Q =
nP (
^
Q)  n
N
[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
(21)
12
This equation shows that by choosing 
N
, the upstream monopolist can de-
termine
8
the downstream industry output
^
Q. Therefore we write
^
Q =
^
Q(
N
),
and q^
i
= q^
i
(
^
Q; 
i
) = q^
i
(
N
; 
i
) (with a slight abuse of notation.) The quantity
of input that rm i purchases from the upstream monopoly is
y
i
= d
i
q^
i
  x
i
(t
i
) = d
i
q^
i
(
N
; 
i
)  x
i
(
i
=d
i
)  y
i
(
N
; 
i
)
with
@y
i
(
N
; 
i
)
@
i
=
d
i
P
0
(
^
Q)
 
x
0
i
(t
i
)
d
i
< 0
Now consider stage 1. (We do not consider two-part taris here). The
upstream monopolist sets the t
i
's (and hence 
i
and 
N
) to maximize its
prot
max

i

S
=
X
i2N

i
d
i
y
i
(
N
; 
i
)  C
S
"
X
i2N
y
i
(
N
; 
i
)
#
(22)
We wish to determine conditions under which the monopolist nds it prof-
itable to practice discount reversal. To do this, it is convenient to solve the
problem (22) in two steps. In the rst step, 
N
is xed, so that
^
Q =
^
Q(
N
)
is xed, and the optimal 
i
's are determined subject to
P
i2N

i
= n
N
. In
the second step we determine 
N
. The Lagrangian for the rst step is
L =
X
i2N

i
d
i
y
i
(
N
; 
i
)  C
S
"
X
i2N
y
i
(
N
; 
i
)
#
+ 
"
X
i2N

i
  n
N
#
Assuming an interior maximum, we get the rst order conditions
y
i
d
i
+

i
d
i
@y
i
@
i
  C
0
S
@y
i
@
i
+  = 0 (23)
This equation yields 

i
= 
i
(; 
N
). Therefore, substituting into the con-
straint, we get
X
i2N

i
(; 
N
)  n
N
= 0
which yields  = (
N
). Given 
N
, the monopolist's optimal input price t
i
is
t

i
=


i
d
i
= C
0
S
 
1
@y
i
@
i

y
i
(
N
; 

i
)
d
i
+ (
N
)

(24)
8
We assume that nP (Q) + QP
0
(Q) is a decreasing function (see (1)) and that it is
negative if Q is suciently large.
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To proceed further, let us assume that U
i
(x
i
) = (1=2)u
i
x
2
i
. Then (24) gives
t

i
=
1
2
"
C
0
S
+ [u
i
d
i
]
P (
^
Q) + (
N
)[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
d
2
i
u
i
+ [ P
0
(
^
Q)]
#
(25)
From (25), we obtains the following result:
Proposition 3.1:Under the assumption that U
i
(x
i
) = (1=2)u
i
x
2
i
.
(a) If the costs of downstream self-supply (the u
i
's) are very high then
the monopolist will practice discount reversal, i.e., a lower d
i
implies a higher
t
i
:
signft

i
  t

j
g =  signfd
i
  d
j
g
(b) If the costs of downstream self-supply are very low then the monopolist
will not practice discount reversal.
(c) for any pair of downstream rms (i; j) with the same input-requirement
functions (i.e., d
i
= d
j
), the rm with a lower cost of self-supply (i.e., a lower
u) will be charged a lower input price. 2
Proof: (a) and (b): from (25)
sign
@t
i
@d
i
= signf[ P
0
]  d
2
i
u
i
g
The right-hand side is negative if u
i
is suciently great.
(c) from (25), @t
i
=@u
i
> 0:2
Proposition 3.1 is broadly in agreement with the result obtained by Katz
(1987), who showed that if downstream rms can threaten to self-supply then
the the upstream monopolist will give discounts to larger rms. However,
Katz (1987) relied on the assumptions that self-supply involves a positive
xed cost and a constant marginal cost. On the contrary, we assume that
self-supply involves no xed cost, and the marginal cost of self-supply is
increasing.
4 Vertically Integrated Input Supplier and
Access Pricing
In the two preceding sections, the input supplier does not compete in the
downstream market. We now consider the case where the input supplier is
14
vertically integrated with a downstream rm and therefore treats other down-
stream rms as rivals. For instance, in telecommunications, the downstream
sector serves the market for long-distance calls, and the upstream rm is
the owner of the local telephone network, which may be vertically integrated
with a long-distance service provider. Similarly, in the market for electricity,
electricity transmission and distribution may be controlled by one rm, that
also owns an electricity generation plant, in competition with other plants
that rely on the transmission network provided by the integrated rm.
Using the model introduced in this section, we seek answers to the fol-
lowing questions: (i) does the vertically integrated rm has an incentive to
practice discount reversal? (ii) could it be protable for the integrated rm
to treat identical downstream rms \unequally"? (iii) how strong is the in-
centive to raise rivals' cost? (iv) what form does the \Ecient Component
Pricing Rule" (ECPR) take when the downstream rms are non-identical
Cournot oligopolists?
Vickers (1995) addresses the question of access pricing under the assump-
tions that the downstream rms are identical Cournot rivals, and that down-
stream prots are zero due to free entry. Armstrong et al. (1996) assume
that the downstream rms constitute a competitive fringe (i.e., they take
the price of their output as given). We consider the case of asymmetric
downstream rms that are Cournot rivals, and their number is xed.
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be the set of downstream rms. Partition this set
into two subsets, denoted by I = f1; 2; ::; n
I
g and J = fn
I
+ 1; :::; n
I
+ n
J
g
where n
I
+n
J
= n. All members of I are integrated with the upstream rm S
while all members of J are independent rivals. If I consists of more than one
downstream rm, we assume that these downstream rms also compete with
each others, i.e., the integrated rm behaves as if it has a multi-divisional
structure that discourages collusion between the divisions. If the output of
downstream rm h is q
h
, its input need is D
h
(q
h
). This need is satised
partly by purchasing y
h
from the upstream division of the integrated rm,
and partly by self-supplying the quantity x
h
= D
h
(q
h
)   y
h
. The cost of
self-supply is U
h
(x
h
). The prots of the downstream rms are

h
= Pq
h
  t
h
y
h
  U
h
(x
h
); h 2 I [ J  N
where y
h
+ x
h
= D
h
(q
h
). For simplicity, we assume that
D
h
(q
h
) = d
h
q
h
; h 2 N
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The prot of the upstream division (i.e., the input supplier S) of the inte-
grated rm is

S
=
X
h2N
(t
h
  c)y
h
where c > 0 is the upstream rm's constant marginal cost. The total prot
of the integrated rm is

IS
= 
S
+
X
h2I

h
=
X
j2J
(t
j
  c)y
j
+
X
i2I
(P   d
i
c)q
i
+
X
i2I
[cx
i
  U
i
(x
i
)]
The timing of the game is as followed. In the last stage, all the n downstream
entities (the n
I
divisions of the integrated rms and the n
J
independent
downstream rms) compete as Cournot rivals. Each entity h chooses its nal
output level q
h
and its own production of intermediate input x
h
 d
h
q
h
,
while taking as given all the pairs (q
k
; x
k
) for k 6= h. They also take as
pre-determined the input prices t
h
dictated by the upstream entity S. Thus
entity h seeks to maximize

h
= P (Q
 h
+ q
h
)q
h
  t
h
d
h
q
h
+ [t
h
x
h
  U
h
(x
h
)]
subject to d
h
q
h
 h
h
 0.
The assumption that the downstream divisions of the integrated rms are
Cournot rivals of each other may, or may not, be a good description of \real
world" situations. Readers who feel uncomfortable with this assumption are
requested to set n
I
= 1.
Assuming an interior solution, we have 2n rst-order conditions:
P
0
(Q)q
h
+ P (Q) = t
h
d
h
t
h
  U
0
h
(x
h
) = 0
These conditions give q^
h
= q^
h
(
N
; 
h
) and x^
h
= x^
h
(t
h
), where 
h
= t
h
d
h
and 
N
= (1=n)
P
h2N

h
.This stage gives the equilibrium prot of the down-
stream entities
^
h
= [ P
0
(
^
Q)]q^
2
h
+ V

h
(t
h
)
where V

h
(t
h
)  max
x
h
ft
h
x
h
  u
h
(x
h
)g s.t. x
h
 0.
We now turn to the rst stage of the game, when the integrated rm
chooses the t
h
's to maximize its prot
^

IS
=
X
j2J
(t
j
  c)by
j
+
X
i2I
(
^
P   d
i
c)q^
i
+
X
i2I
[cx^
i
  U
i
(x^
i
)]
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where
^
P = P (
^
Q(
N
)), q^
h
= [
^
P   d
h
t
h
]=[ 
^
P
0
] for all h 2 N , by
j
= d
j
q^
j
for
all j 2 J , and x^
i
= x^
i
(t
i
) for all i 2 I. Recalling that t
h
= 
h
=d
h
, we can
formulate the optimization problem of the integrated rm as that of choosing
the t
h
' s to maximize
^

IS
: As in the preceding section, we solve this problem
in two steps. In step 1, we x 
N
(so that
^
P is xed, and optimize with
respect to the t
h
's subject to 
N
  (1=n)
P
h2N
t
h
d
h
= 0. The Lagrangian is
L =
^

IS
+ 
"
X
h2N
t
h
d
h
  n
N
#
Manipulations of the rst-order conditions yield
t
i
= c+
 
d
i
[ 
^
P
0
]x
0
i
!
h
[ 
^
P
0
]  (
^
P   d
i
c)
i
; i 2 I (26)
and, for all j 2 J ,
t
j
= c+
 
d
j
d
2
j
+ [ 
^
P
0
]x
0
j
!
h
[ 
^
P
0
] +
^
P   d
j
t
j
  [ 
^
P
0
](x^
j
=d
j
)
i
(27)
These formulas are only implicit because the t
i
(or t
j
) appear on both sides
of the equations. One may relate these formulas to the \ecient compo-
nent pricing rule" (ECPR) derived by Armstrong, Doyles and Vickers (ADV,
1996):
Input price (or access price) = direct cost + opportunity cost of providing
access.
However, we should note that ECPR was derived by ADV under the
objective of maximizing welfare, not maximizing the prot of the integrated
rm. Our component pricing rules (26) and (27) are for a monopolist. It
contains the Lagrange multiplier  which, as shown in the Appendix, can be
solved for in terms of the given 
N
.
In order to proceed further, let us assume that
U
h
(x
h
) =
u
h
x
2
h
2
(28)
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then we have
t
i
= c+
"
d
i
c+ 

[ 
^
P
0
] 
^
P
[ 
^
P
0
]
#
d
i
u
i
; i 2 I (29)
t
j
=
1
2
"
c+


[ 
^
P
0
] +
^
P
d
2
j
u
j
+ [ 
^
P
0
]
(d
j
u
j
)
#
; j 2 J (30)
(Note that 

can be determined in terms of 
N
and other parameters; see
the Appendix.) It follows that for any pair (i; i
0
) such that d
i
= d
i
0
, we have
t
i
  c
t
i
0
  c
=
u
i
u
i
0
; i; i
0
2 I
and for any pair (j; j
0
), we have
t
j
  (c=2)
t
j
0
  (c=2)
=

j

j
0
; j; j
0
2 J
where

j
=
d
j
u
j
d
2
j
u
j
+ [ 
^
P
0
]
(Note that @
j
=@u
j
> 0). Thus we have established the following results:
Proposition 4.1: If (28) holds, then
(i) the input prices for external downstream rms (that have the same
d
j
) are subject to discounts, i.e., rms with a lower u
j
will be charged a lower
t
j
.
(ii) within the integrated rms, the transfer prices applied to downstream
divisions are more favourable to those with lower costs of self-supply.2
Property (ii) implies that the less ecient divisions are \penalized", so
that the integrated rm can achieve a greater prot by shifting market power
to those divisions that have lower costs of self-supply. Property (i) was
already derived in the preceding section, where the upstream rm is not
vertically integrated.
Remark 4.1: From (30), we can ask the following question: for a given

N
, (so that
^
Q is xed), and a given number n of downstream entities, how
does t
j
change if the set I of downstream divisions expands relative to the
set J of independent downstream rms? To simplify, assume that the d
h
's
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are the same for all h 2 N . Compare the situation where I is the empty set
(i.e., the upstream rm is not integrated with any downstream rm) with
the situation where I consist of only one rm, which we denote as rm 1
without loss of generality. Let 

0
(
N
) and 

1
(
N
) denote the optimal value
of the Lagrange multiplier in these two situations respectively. If u
1
is very
small, then we can show (see the Appendix) that


1
(
N
) < 

0
(
N
) (31)
This inequality implies that t
j
decreases when the upstream rm is vertical
integrated with rm 1. Thus, for a given 
N
, vertical integration does not
result in a \raising rivals' cost" strategy. (This conclusion must be qualied:
we would expect that vertical integration would lead to a change in the
integrated rm's optimal choice of 
N
.)
Remark 4.2: From (30) and assuming the concavity
9
of
^

SI
with respect
to the t
j
's, we conclude that, for any pair of identical downstream rms, the
integrated rm charges them the same input price. Thus \equals are treated
equally". As we will see in the following section, this property no longer
holds in a model where the upstream rm S can choose quality levels that it
oers to downstream rms.
Remark 4.3: The second step in the solving the optimization problem
of the integrated rm consists of determining the optimal 
N
. This can be
done using the approach taken in the preceding section.
5 Quality Discrimination and Access
So far, we have focussed on input price discrimination. As pointed out by
Vickers (1995, p. 14), input price is only one of several possible ways that an
integrated rm could use to restrict access. Another dimension of restriction
is the quality of access. Quality discrimination gives rm S an alternative
way of raising rivals' costs. According to Vickers, \ a possible example is the
interconnection of telecommunications networks. Though the pricing terms
on which British Telecom was to give access to its rival Mercury were set in
1985, there has been continuing dispute about the quality of that access in
terms of delays, the quality of lines and exchanges, etc., and the impact on
Mercury's competitive position"(p.14).
9
The function 
SI
is strictly concave in the t
j
's if U
h
(x
h
) = (u
h
=)x

h
where 2   
1.(See the Appendix.)
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In this section, we complement Vickers' informal discussion on quality
of access, by developing a formal model. We will show that input quality
discrimination exhibits a new feature not encountered in input price discrim-
ination: under certain conditions, the upstream rm will nd it protable to
oer identical downstream rms non-identical quality level
10
.
There are n downstream rms. Firm i's output is q
i
. Its unit production
cost is d
i
= d
i
(
i
) where 
i
is the quality level of the access supply by the
upsream rm S. Firm S is not vertically integrated.We assume that
d
i
(
i
) = d
0i
  r
i
(
i
)
where d
0i
> 0 and r
i
(0) = 0; r
0
i
> 0. Thus r
i
(
i
) is the reduction in unit cost
when the quality of access exceeds the minimum level 0.
Quality is assumd to be objectively measurable, so that 
i
is the number
of \units of quality" that rm i buys from rm S. Firm S announces to
rm i that the price of each unit of quality is t
i
. In addition, there is a xed
charge T
i
. Firm i's total cost of producing q
i
units of nal output is
C
i
= d
i
(
i
)q
i
+ t
i

i
+ T
i
+ F
i
Given any planned output q
i
and given the pair (t
i
; T
i
) oered by the up-
stream rm, rm i chooses the quality level 
i
that it wants to purchase from
S to minimize the per unit cost: Thus 

i
is given by
t
i
=q
i
= r
0
(

i
) (32)
The cost function of rm i is then
C
i
(q
i
; t
i
) = d
i
(

i
(t
i
=q
i
))q
i
+ t
i


i
(t
i
=q
i
) + T
i
+ F
i
Dene the marginal cost of output q
i
as

i

@C
i
(q
i
; t
i
)
@q
i
= d
i
(

i
(t
i
=q
i
)) = d
0
i
  r
i
[

i
(t
i
=q
i
)] (33)
(where we have made used of the property (32).) Note that since r
i
(:)  0,

i
 d
0i
(34)
10
This is another instance of a class of problems where \equals are treated unequally",
see Long and Soubeyran (1997a).
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From (33):


i
= r
 1
i
[d
0i
  
i
] (35)
Consider the Cournot equilibrium achieved by the downstream oligopolists,
given the t
i
's. The rst order conditions yield
q^
i
=
^
P   
i
[ 
^
P
0
]
(36)
where
^
P = P (
^
Q(
N
)).
The prot of the upstream rm, in the case of linear taris (i.e. T
i
= 0),
is
^

S
=
X
i2N
t
i


i
(t
i
=q^
i
)  C
S
"
X
i2N


i
(t
i
=q^
i
)
#
(37)
Using (32), t
i
= q^
i
r
0
i
(
i
), (35), and (36), we can express (37) as function of
the 
i
's:
^

S
=
X
i2I
^
P   
i
[ 
^
P
0
]

r
0
i
(r
 1
i
(d
0i
  
i
))

 
C
S
"
X
i2N
r
 1
i
(d
0i
  
i
)
#
(38)
Thus, the optimization problem of the upstream rm amounts to choosing
the 
i
's (via the choice of the t
i
's; see (33) and (36)) to maximize
^

S
, subject
to (34), and
^
P   
i
 0 (to ensure that the q^
i
's are non-negative). If the
constraint (34) is binding for some i, this means that rm i is induced to
purchase the lowest quality of access (
i
= 0) because t
i
is too expensive.
Proposition 5.1 (Unequal treatment of equals): If the function
^

S
in (38) is strictly convex in the 
i
's (for a given 
N
), then ex-ante identical
rms will be given dierent quality levels.
Example 5.1:(Unequal treatment of equals)
Take the case where
C
S
(
X
i2N

i
) = c
X
i2N

i
and
r
i
(
i
) = (
i

i
)

; 0 <  < 1
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then, from the denition of 
i
,

i
=
1

i
(d
0i
  
i
)
1=
; d
0i
   0
Thus
r
0
i
(
i
)
i
= r
i
(
i
) = (d
0i
  
i
)
and, for a given 
N
, the prot of the upstream rm is
^

S
= A(
N
; 
1
; :::; 
n
)  B(
1
; :::; 
n
)
where
A(
N
; 
1
; :::; 
n
) =

[ 
^
P
0
]
X
i2N
(
^
P   
i
)(d
0i
  
i
)
B(
1
; :::; 
n
) = c
X
i2N
1

i
[d
0i
  
i
]
1=
Notice that A and B are both convex functions. If  = 1=2 and c is small,
then A   B is convex: Then, for a given 
N
, the optimum is at a corner;
see Figures 1A and 1B for the case n = 2. Here, for a given 
N
, the vector
(
1
; 
2
) must lie on the line segment HK. The convexity of A   B implies
that the maximum for 
S
occurs at H or K.
Remark 5.1: Proposition 5.1 indicates that, from the point of view of
rm S, optimal input quality discrimination is very dierent from input price
discrimination. This is because the two types of inputs are quite dierent.
In the former case, the input is the quality of access, which is independent
of the output levels of the downstream rm. In the latter case, the input is
produced materials that must be increased if the downstream rms expand
their output levels.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that, even with a general demand curve, \discount reversals"
occur when an upstream rm practices input price discrimination for a vital
input that downstream rms cannot produce themselves. However if down-
stream rms can, to some extent, self-supply the vital input, then discount
reversals may no longer be protable for the upstream rm. Moreover, if the
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upstream rm is integrated with one or several downstream rms, then in
general it will give discount to larger downstream divisions. An integrated
rm with several downstream divisions will not treat them the same way:
the more cost-ecient divisions (with respect to self-supply) will be charged
a lower price for the input sold by the upstream rm.
Quality of access provided by the upstream rm can vary accross down-
stream rms. We have shown that this can be the case even when all down-
stream rms are ex-ante identical. By treating ex-ante equal rms unequally,
the upstream rm ensures that, for a given output level of the downstream
industry, aggregate downtream production cost is minimized. Unlike raw ma-
terials, which tend to be proportional to nal output level, quality of access is
somewhat like capital equipment that shifts down the marginal cost curves.
Thus it may be more ecient to concentrate this type of \investment" in one
downstream rm, to exploit a sort of economy of scale.
We have also derived an access pricing rule from the point of view of an
upstream rm that faces heterogenous downstream oligopolists. This rule
resembles the \ecient component pricing rule" (ECPR) in the regulation
literature.
In the models where self-supply is possible, we have assumed that a down-
tream rms cannot sell or buy the intermediate input from each other. This
assumption was made to simplify the analysis. For a model which allows for
the downstream market for the intermediate input, see Long and Soubeyran
(1999).
Several tasks remain to de done. First, an ECPR should be derived from
the point of view of a regulator. Second, asymmetric information should be
introduced, because the regulator may not know the cost structure of the
rms. Third, in the case of quality of access, we must nd out whether
there is a strong incentive for an integrated rm to raise rivals' costs. Other
possible generalizations include (i) the case where downstream rms need
several intermediate inputs, each being produced by a distinct upstream rm,
and (ii) the case where each downstream rm produces, in addition to the
nal good, an intermediate input, which it exchanges for other intermediate
inputs produced by other downstream rms.
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APPENDIX A.1: Examples illustrating (10) and (11)
Example 2.1: with  = 1 (linear downstream costs), (10) gives
q^

i
= 
i
(;
^
Q) =
  vb
i
2[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
and (11) gives


(
^
Q) =
2
^
Q[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
n
+
v
n
X
i2N
b
i
> 0
Therefore
q^

i
(
^
Q) =
^
Q
n
 
v
2[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
[b
i
  b
N
]
where b
N
 (1=n)
P
i2N
b
i
. Thus,
sign[q^

i
(
^
Q)  q^

j
(
^
Q)] =  sign [b
i
  b
j
]
that is, the rm with lower cost will produce more, conrming Proposition
2.1.
Example 2.2: with  = 2 (quadratic downstream costs), (10) gives
q^

i
= 
i
(;
^
Q) =

2f[ P
0
(
^
Q)] + vb
i
g
  
i
(
^
Q)
and (11) gives


(
^
Q) =
^
Q
P
i2N
 
i
(
^
Q)
Therefore
q^

i
(
^
Q) =
 
i
(
^
Q)
^
Q
P
i2N
 
i
(
^
Q)
Here, also, we obtain
signfq^

i
(
^
Q)  q^

j
(
^
Q)g = signf 
i
(
^
Q)   
j
(
^
Q)g =  sign [b
i
  b
j
]
APPENDIX A.2: The determination of 

in Section 4.
Recall that
P
h2N
b
h
t
h
= n
N
. Substituting (29) and (30) into the left-
hand side, we obtain


(
N
) =
A+B
D
(39)
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where
A = n
N
 
X
i2I
d
i
c 
1
2
X
j2J
d
j
c
B =
1
[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
X
i2I
[
^
P   d
i
c]d
2
i
u
i
 
^
P
2
X
j2J

j
D =
[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
2
+
X
i2I
d
2
i
u
i
with

j
=
d
2
j
u
j
d
2
j
u
j
+ [ P
0
(
^
Q)]
APPENDIX A.3: Proof of (31)
Let d
h
= 1 for all h 2 N . Then 

(
N
) in (39) becomes


(
N
) =
A
0
+B
0
D
0
where
A
0
= n
N
  (c=2)(n+ n
I
)
B
0
=
[
^
P   c]
[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
X
i2I
u
i
 
^
P
2
X
j2J

j
D
0
=
X
i2I
u
i
+
[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
2
where

j
=
u
j
u
j
+ [ P
0
(
^
Q)]
When n
I
= 0; we have 

(
N
) = 

0
(
N
) where


0
(
N
) =
E
F
with
E = n
N
  (nc=2) 
^
P
2
X
j2N

j
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and
F =
[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
2
When n
I
= 1; we have 

(
N
) = 

1
(
N
) where


1
(
N
) =
E +G
F + u
1
where
G = u
1
"
[
^
P   c]
[ P
0
(
^
Q)]
+
^
P
2fu
1
+ [ P
0
(
^
Q)]g
#
 
c
2
If u
1
is very small, then 

1
(
N
) < 

0
(
N
). Thus, at an unchanged 
N
,
the integration of an upstream rm with a downstream rm reduces the t
j
's,
j 2 J . (However, 
N
would not be unchanged when the integration occurs.)
APPENDIX A.4: The concavity of 
IS
@
IS
@t
i
=  
"
d
i
(
^
P   d
i
c)
[ 
^
P
0
]
#
  (t
i
  c)x^
0
i
+ d
i
@
IS
@t
j
= y^
j
+ (t
j
  c)
@y^
j
@t
j
+ d
j
@
2

IS
@t
2
i
=  x^
0
i
  (t
i
  c)x^
00
i
@
2

IS
@t
2
j
= 2
@y^
j
@t
j
+ (t
j
  c)
@
2
y^
j
@t
2
j
where, from t
h
= U
0
i
(x^
i
);
x^
0
i
=
1
U
00
i
(x^
i
)
> 0
and
x^
00
i
=  
U
000
i
(x^
i
)
[U
00
i
(x^
i
)]
3
> 0
if U
000
i
(x^
i
) < 0.
We also have
@y^
j
@t
j
=  
d
2
j
[ 
^
P
0
]
  x^
0
j
< 0
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and
@
2
y^
j
@t
2
j
=  x^
00
j
It follows that
@
2

IS
@t
2
j
=  2
"
d
2
j
[ 
^
P
0
]
+ x^
0
j
#
  (t
j
  u
j
)x^
00
j
Let us specify
U
h
(x
h
) =

u
h


x

h
;   1
then U
000
h
 0 if and only if 2    1. In this case, x^
00
j
> 0 and @
2

IS
=@t
2
j
< 0
if t
j
 c.
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